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TOWARD A UNIFORM APPROACH TO
MULTILEVEL DISTRIBUTORSHIPS
[H]asty and adventurous schemes are at firsi view flattering, in
execution difficult, and in the issue disastrous.'
The phenomenal growth and eventual collapse of the enterprises of
Glenn Wesley Turner and William Penn Patrick2 during the 1960's
should have surprised no one. They were only a recent example of an
old and recurrent merchandising scheme,3 a variant of the chain letter
device. Such operations, commonly called pyramid sales schemes, can
temporarily succeed where a credulous public, willing to believe that
it can get rich quickly for a small monetary investment and little or
no expenditure of effort, exists in a legal system lacking a coordinated
program for the prevention of such machinations. Pyramid sales
schemes have been called "the No. 1 consumer fraud problem in the
United States today."4 This article will describe the methods of oper-
ation of various types of pyramid sales schemes, distinguish them from
legitimate multilevel marketing companies, survey the traditional fed-
eral administrative and state legislative approaches and the judicial
response to the problem, and examine a recent state enactment and
pending federal proposal designed to eliminate such activities in their
incipiency.
LivY, THE HISTORY OF ROME, Book XXXV, ch. 32.
2 At the zenith of its success, Glenn W. Turner Enterprises held seventy subsidiaries. His
best known ventures are Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., a cosmetics firm, and Dare To Be
Great, a series of self-improvement courses. Patrick's Holiday Magic, Inc., once controlled
406 subsidiaries selling such items as cosmetics, oil additives, food supplements, and clean-
ing supplies. By 1973, Koscot had filed for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act, and the
Holiday Magic empire had dwindled to thirty-two subsidiaries. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1973, at
76. See also TIME, July 16, 1973, at 51.
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Co. v. Quilling, 130 Wis. 318, 110 N.W. 174 (1907).
4 Statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Hearings on S. 1939 Before the Subcomm. for
Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90, at 14 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. See also TIME, July 16, 1973, at 51. The precise amount of
money invested in pyramid sales schemes in recent years can not be calculated. Warren
Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, estimates it to be "well over a half billion
dollars." Statement of Warren Spannaus, Hearings, at 28. In 1972, the Securities and
Exchange Commission was aware of somewhat over 150 pyramid sales schemes in opera-
tion, in which the public had invested over $300 million. 168 BNA SEC. REG. L. REP. A-4
(Sept. 13, 1972). The SEC has charged Holiday Magic alone with defrauding 80,000 people of
$250 million. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1973, at 76.
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I. THE NATURE OF A PYRAMID SCHEME
A. Basic Design
Pyramid sales schemes, also known as multilevel, endless chain, or
chain distributor schemes, are investment programs employing a
multiple-tiered distribution method (typically consisting of salesman,
supervisor or retail franchiser, distributor or wholesale franchiser, and
manufacturer) for the sale of supervisory positions. Although pyramid
sales firms deal in a product or service,' opportunities for profit or
promotion are not based upon sales volume or legitimate recruiting
efforts, but upon success in selling the right to sell the investment pro-
gram to others. Instead of the bona fide sales of merchandise or services,
the chief business purpose of such an operation is the sale of distribu-
torships with the right to sell new distributorship opportunities to
others continually until an unlimited number of people are pyramided
into the scheme.6
Pyramid sales schemes are readily distinguishable from franchising,
7
one of this country's most important national merchandising tech-
niques.8 In a pyramid operation, the investor's pecuniary benefit derives
primarily from his success in inducing additional persons to participate
in the plan, whereas the success of a franchisee depends primarily upon
the retail sales of products or services to the consuming public. In a
franchise or subfranchise9 the purpose of direct selling recruitment is
' They are usually high markup items such as health or beauty aids, cleaning agents, or
automobile additives. Statement of Warren Spannaus, Hearings, at 28. "The products are
usually worthless or worth very little, and nonexistent . Testimony of Sen. Walter F.
Mondale, Hearings, supra note 4, at 18.
6 See New York Dep't of Law, Memorandum in Support of Senate 1645, Assembly 2337
(1973) at 1.
7 Franchising is defined in REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, PYRAMID SALES
ACT, REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]:
Franchising is a method of distribution whereby one party, the franchisor,
contracts with or licenses another party, the franchisee, to distribute goods and
services pursuant to a uniform and standardized method of doing business.
Franchise systems usually include a trademark or service mark (the principal
ingredient in the system which is licensed); a territory in which the franchisee
operates; an initial payment, periodic royalty payments, or both (paid by the
franchisee to the franchisor for the right to operate under the system); and the
name which the franchisor has developed.
See Statement of Philip Zeidman, counsel for the International Franchise Association,
Hearings, supra note 4, at 40, 48.
8 The United States has over 500,000 franchised outlets with an annual sales volume
exceeding $90 billion. New York Dep't of Law, Memorandum re Senate 880, Assembly 759,
A.G. Prog. No. 72, Jan. 3, 1973, at 1. It is officially estimated that between one-quarter and
one-third of all goods and services sold at retail in the United States are distributed through
franchising. Statement of Philip Zeidman, Hearings, supra note 4, at 40, 48.
9 Subfranchising is a system under which a person is given the opportunity both to develop
in his own name and to recruit others to develop areas for themselves. In multiple franchis-
ing, an individual or company receives rights to develop a specific area with numerous
franchise units. Most franchisors use at least one of these arrangements. Statement of Philip
Zeidman, Hearings, supra note 4, at 41.
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to procure sales personnel for the product or service; in a pyramid sales
scheme, the purpose is to recruit investments from individuals in return
for the opportunity to sell more of such investments without regard
to the sale of products or services. It is not the act of recruitment which
makes pyramid schemes suspect but the method of recruiting through
unrealistic promises and mandatory investment."'
B. Variations
The most common types of pyramid sales schemes employ an
approach incorporating either a multilevel distributorship or a referral
sales or founder-member contract plan. In the multilevel distributor-
ship, the attainment of promotions and the acquisition of return on
investments are dependent upon the recruitment of other investors
through the sale of distributorships." Referral sales schemes generally
involve the sale of goods at inflated prices to purchasers who are
promised commissions for the solicitation of other purchasers. 2 A
founder-member, or customer referral, scheme entails the purchase of
goods at inflated prices with the expectation that the profit will be used
by the vendor to finance the construction of a local discount store of
which the purchaser will be considered a "founding member." This
designation authorizes him to distribute "authorized buyer" or
"founder-member" cards to his friends and to receive commissions on
sales made to them at the outlet.'
3
As public awareness of such schemes has increased, new variations
have developed. One of these is the "front-end loading" scheme, in
which an investor is required to purchase a large supply of the com-
pany's products in order to become a distributor and receive a per-
centage of the purchase price of similar merchandise which is bought
by new "distributors" recruited by him. These products are ordinarily
relegated to storage since the real profit is to be made on the kickbacks
paid by the company for the sales it makes to the distributor's
recruits. 4 Another variation is the "sliding volume discount schedule,"
10 See Statement of J. Robert Brouse, President of Direct Selling Association, Hearings,
supra note 4, at 67.
' See, e.g., State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d
416 (1973); People ex rel. Attorney General v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 37 Mich. App.
447, 195 N.W.2d 43 (1972).
"' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1966); Norman v. World Wide
Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
13 See, e.g., Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. App. 1969),
aff'd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213
So. 2d 841 (1968).
14 An example of the operation of a front-end loading scheme is given in Statement of
Warren Spannaus, Hearings, supra note 4, at 29:
For example, a person may be required to buy 20 cases of the company's
[VOL. 8:546
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in which the basic wholesale price established by the company is re-
duced for large quantity purchasers. This discount encourages the
investor to buy from his sponsor rather than the company. The
prospective distributor is then granted the right to purchase directly
from the company, while his sponsor receives an override from the
company on all sales made to him or his recruits.15 Both restraints
effectuate a vertical monopolization of the marketing process.
Investors are lured into such schemes by promises that their
financial success is assured through the operation of the "multiplier"
effect, which in reality is the geometric expansion required to continue
the chain. They are not told that such expansion assures success only
to the first levels of investors and, because of market saturation, neces-
sarily assures losses to later level participants. 16 Because the gain
realized by the early investors is dependent upon the inevitable loss
suffered by later investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has characterized as "patently fraudulent"1 the failure of pyramid sales
promotions to inform prospective investors of the finite number of
potential participants in an area. Likening pyramid practices to chain
letter operations, a number of courts have concluded that they are
"inherently deceptive"' 8 and "doomed to eventual failure"'9 as a
cleaning solution at its supposed wholesale price of $4,000 to become a dis-
tributor. He then gets the right to recruit other persons and makes a 25% profit
on the $4,000 which each recruit invests to buy the 20 case entry ticket into the
scheme. The product sits in each distributor's cellar while he is out trying to
find more recruits.
15 Id.
16 The process is described in Senate Report, supra note 7, at 3:
If each person recruits five people, then by the time the thirteenth level in the
pyramid has been reached, the number of distributors will exceed the popula-













17 SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5211, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9387,
Applicability of Securities Laws to Multilevel Distributorship and Pyramid Sales Plans, Nov.
30, 1971, at 4.
'" Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 232, 293 A.2d 682, 690
(1972).
19 State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 676, 512 P.2d 416,
423.
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matter of mathematical and economic certainty. In addition to being
fraudulent, pyramid sales schemes divert capital from the production of
goods and services.20
C. Method of Operation
Chain selling schemes are generally directed at members of the
lower economic strata,2' upon whose financial need and naivet6 the
recruiters capitalize. Initial contact may be established through word-
of-mouth invitations from distributor-investors ("the cold canvass") or
by cryptic handbills or newspaper advertisements displaying an exag-
gerated "income potential" figure22 and inviting those interested to
attend an "opportunity meeting," often held in a prominent and con-
veniently located hotel ("the curiosity approach"). At these meetings
professional sales promoters, operating according to a carefully re-
hearsed program, state a pseudospontaneous revival type demonstra-
tion. An assortment of techniques, usually including an ostentatious
display of cash and affluence by previous investors, testimonials,
applause, cheering, chanting, and singing, 23 are utilized in an effort to
create an hysterical reaction suppressing the prospects' ordinary
powers of reason and judgment.24 While the emphasis is upon eliciting
a positive emotional response,25 ridicule is also injected into the
20 See Comment, Federal Regulation of P-yramid Sales Schemes, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 137,
144.
21 The "overwhelming majority" of complaints against Holiday Magic received by the
New York Department of Consumer Affairs were from "poor blacks and Puerto Ricans who
believed they were being offered the chance to make a fortune." Consumer Affairs Sues
Holiday Magic for Engaging in Pyramid Sales Scheme, City of New York Dep't of Consumer
Affairs News Release, Feb. 21, 1973, at 2 [hereinafter cited as News Release]. Young couples
about to start a family and senior citizens seeking retirement security are particularly
susceptible. Statement of Warren Spannaus; Hearings, supra note 4, at 20.
22 Dr. John R. Darling, a market and business administration consultant, testified that the
$26,000 annual earnings projected in the "Golden Opportunity Meeting" training manual
would require 72,000 directors in Kansas although Koscot claimed a quota of about 316 in
that state. State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 673, 512 P.2d
416, 421.
23 Koscot's theme song was "Money, money, money." Another favorite is "With a Little
Bit of Luck" from My Fair Lady. Statement of Warren Spannus, Hearings, supra note 4, at
25.
24 See Senate Report, supra note 7, at 3.
25 Holiday Magic's "Instructor General Manual," printed for the use of its operators,
candidly states the purpose of such opportunity meetings:
Our objective is to bring our prospect to the point where he feels excited at
the end of the meeting-hefeels a ray of hope and an inkling that this may be his
way out of his financial problems-he can think of only three things: himself,
money, and Holiday Magic-he likes the way he feels, so his thoughts must be
compatible-HIMSELF AND MONEY THROUGH HOLIDAY MAGIC!
He feels, he feels, he feels-herein lies the key. FEELING is an emotional
reaction. It is obvious that to achieve our objective with our prospect-good
feelings associated about [sic] Holiday Magic-we will be dealing on an emo-
tional basis constantly.
Instructor General Manual of Holiday Magic, Inc., quoted in Brief for Plaintiff at 15,
Myerson v. Holiday Magic, Inc. (Feb. 5, 1973).
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presentation to reinforce negative feelings, such as shame, which the
prospective investors may have about themselves or their economic
situation.2 1 Individuals who are not persuaded to enroll by the end of
the meeting are treated to a cocktail party and supplemental pep talks
intended to dull their physical and mental processes sufficiently that
they succumb either that evening or early the next morning upon
visitation by the distributor.27 If the prospect still refuses to sign an
agreement, he is invited to a free tour of the company's headquarters
where he will be surrounded by high-pressure promoters and isolated
from other outsiders in a final effort to weaken his resistance.2
Since it soon becomes evident to the new recruits that the
extravagant promises of wealth made at the opportunity meetings are
only available to the initial investors,29 pyramiders characteristically
move from town to town and state to state as soon as they swindle the
less sophisticated portion of the populace, leaving in their wake a
saturated market and a host of disappointed investors. In many cases,
these investors are persuaded to finance their participation through
loans on the assurance that by the time the note comes due they will
have ample earnings with which to honor it." The interest on these
loans compounds the financial problem which they expected to solve by
their participation in the scheme.
31
While most pyramids may be entered initially at modest rates,32 the
26 News Release, supra note 21, at 2:
At the meetings, a great deal of psychological pressure is placed on the
consumer to get him to enroll .... Speakers tell the crowds,
"Unfortunately 95 percent of the people in this room tonight will
probably never get anywhere in life because they won't make the
effort to get out of their mediocre rut."
An extreme example of this technique was the practice of Sta-Power Industries, Inc., an
affiliate of Holiday Magic ostensibly dealing in automotive additives, which collected fees
from its distributors to attend "leadership training schools" at which they were beaten and
subjected to bizarre physical abuses. Statement of Warren Spannaus, Hearings, supra note
4, at 33.
27 Statement of Warren Spannaus, Hearings, supra note 4, at 26.
28 See Comment, supra note 20, at 138.
29 For example, 96 percent of Koscot's Kansas supervisors and directors showed no
wholesale earnings for the year 1971. State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
212 Kan. 668, 673, 512 P.2d 416, 420-21.
30 Pyramid promoters have been known to instruct prospective investors on the methods
of applying for a loan, even to the point of recommending such techniques as buying a
demolished new car from ajunkyard and financing it through a banker who does not insist on
personal inspection. In some instances, promoters have posed as legitimate dealers for the
purpose of confirming the bank's inquiries regarding the investor's loan application. See
Statement of Warren Spannaus, Hearings, supra note 4, at 20, 32. For a discussion of Dare
To Be Great's advice to "fake it 'til you make it," see SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1973).
SI Statement of Warren Spannaus, Hearings, supra note 4, at 30.
32 In New York, Holiday Magic charged $11.99 to become a "Holiday Girl" and $91.41 to
become an "Organizer." News Release, supra note 21, at 2. In Iowa, one could become a
Koscot "beauty advisor" for $10. State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191
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cheaper positions appear to be offered as part of a "bait and switch"
tactic 33 in which pressure is exerted to divert investment toward the
more expensive positions. 4 Clearly, the complex network of commis-
sions, finder's fees, discounts, overrides, and rebates which remunerate
the distributors and prohibit the lower level participants from buying
directly from the company is a strong incentive to move up the chain
through additional investment. 35  This rigidly integrated internal
organization has made pyramid sales schemes vulnerable to attack on
the ground of unduly restraining competition.36
II. LEGAL CONTROL OF PYRAMID SALES
A. Administrative Agencies
There is presently no federal law prohibiting pyramid sales schemes
per se. However, the United States Department of Justice, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission
have experienced varying degrees of success in prosecuting the more
flagrant chain abuses under existing lottery,37 securities,3" and con-
sumer fraud3 9 laws, respectively.
In prosecutions employing the lottery approach, the United States
Department of Justice assumes the burden of proving the presence of
three elements: consideration (the payments made by the investor),
prize (the payment of commissions or rebates made by the company),
and chance (the uncertainty whether recruits will be both available
and willing to invest).4" The most elusive of these elements is chance.
N.W.2d 624, 627 (Iowa 1971). In Kansas the price was $50. State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 671, 512 P.2d 416, 420.
11 News Release, supra note 21, at 2.
31 In New York, forexample, Holiday Magic charged $4,500to become a "Master" and an
additional $4,000 to become a "General." News Release, supra note 21, at 2. Koscot
supervisorships generally sold for $2,000, while distributorships cost $5,000. State ex rel.
Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1971); State ex rel. Sanborn v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 669, 512 P.2d 416, 420.
3' See, e.g., State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 671, 512
P.2d 416, 420:
A supervisor receives a 15% commission on the gross sales of all his beauty
advisors and there is no limitation placed upon the number of such recruits he
may bring into the company. A director receives a 10% commission on the
gross sales of the supervisors he recruits and a 25% commission on the gross
sales of all beauty advisors he recruits.
31 Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682. See part II B
infra.
11 18 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
31 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1973).
11 15 U.S.C § I et seq. (1973).
40 See Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449 (1893); Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies,
181 F. 579 (C.C.N.Y. 1910); United States v. 83 Cases of Merchandise Labeled "Honest
John," 29 F. Supp. 912 (D. Md. 1939).
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In Zebelman v. United States,4 the federal lottery statute42 was used
to prosecute an automobile salesman who informed individuals by
mail that after they purchased a car from him (consideration) they
would become eligible to receive from him the sum of $100 (prize)
for each person they referred to him who purchased a car and $50
(prize) for each new participant's successful referral. The court held
that the promise and payment of the initial $100 prize did not establish
the element of chance necessary for the existence of a lottery because
it was within the control of the original purchaser. However, since the
payment of the $50 prize was totally dependent upon the actions of the
persons whose names were submitted, this second level recruitment
was deemed to exceed ordinary business risk and constitute the chance
element necessary to a lottery. This precedent is therefore not
applicable to single-level plans.43 Its intricate proof requirements also
prohibit reliance upon it as an effective deterrent for so mutable an
abuse.44
The federal mail fraud statute 5 is applicable to cases in which
fraudulent statements or misrepresentations are included in, or dis-
closure of material facts is omitted from, literature distributed through
the United States Postal Service. 40 However, this avenue of approach
to pyramid sales schemes has not yet borne results.47 Since the use of
the mails is not usually essential to the operation of pyramids and since
the complexity of alleged mail fraud schemes and the number of wit-
nesses necessary to prove the charges make investigations and prosecu-
tions under the statute lengthy and expensive, this procedure is
unlikely to be invoked unless the stakes are high enough.4 8 It is there-
fore, at best, only a partial remedy.
The SEC has recently announced its new interpretation4" of § 2(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933."' It takes the position that a security is
involved wherever "the franchisee is not required to make significant
41 339 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1964).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1972).
13 See Letter from Assistant Attorney General W. Vincent Rakestraw to Sen. Warren
Magnuson, Aug. 19, 1974, in Senate Report, supra note 7, at 15.
41 See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
45 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1972).
46 See Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967); Fabian v. United States, 358
F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 821 (1966).
41 Statement of Joel Weisberg, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Hearings,
supra note 4, at 60.
48 See Letter from Assistant Attorney General W. Vincent Rakestraw, supra note 43, at
15. See also Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363 (1965), in which resolution of an action
brought under the mail fraud statute took nearly four years.
49 SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5211, supra note 17, at 1; Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9387, supra note 17, at 1.
10 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1973).
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efforts in the operation of the franchise in order to obtain the promised
return" 51 on his investment. While this ruling declares that an offering
of an investment contract or participation in a profit sharing agreement
by a pyramid operation must comply with the SEC's requirement of
full disclosure of relevant information, its scope is presently uncertain.
It may not, for example, cover chain schemes which, by setting rates
reasonably related to costs, appear to emphasize the distribution and
sale of a product or service. Schemes not exempted, however, will be
required to submit to the cost and scrutiny of registration before the
SEC,, 2 to distribute prospectuses 3 at opportunity meetings, to employ
only qualified dealer-brokers as recruiters,5 4 to be adequately
capitalized, 55 to register under state securities laws,56 and to comply
with other recordkeeping requirements." The employment of de-
ceptive acts or practices in connection with the offer or sale of
securities violates the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act,5" the
Securities Exchange Act,59 and rules promulgated under the SEA.6
The SEC position that pyramid sales schemes are securities has
recently received judicial approval.6 The obstacle to SEC jurisdiction
since 1946 seemed to lie in the Supreme Court's definition of an invest-
ment contract in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.62 The Howey test is "whether
the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others. '63 Even though
the Howey court admitted that the definition of a security "embodies
a flexible rather than a static principle,"64 the application of the test to
pyramid sales schemes would not appear to establish the existence of
investment contracts because they do not necessarily involve total
reliance upon the efforts of others. While more liberal approaches,
such as the "risk capital test," ' which finds a security wherever an
51 SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5211, supra note 17, at 2; Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9387, supra note 17, at 2.
52 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1973).
s3 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1973).
54 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1), (12) (1973).
5- 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(9) (Schedule A) (1973).
56 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1973).
11 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (Schedule A) (1973).
-s 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1973).
59 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b), § 77o (1973).
60 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.15c1-2.
61 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474
F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
62 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
63 Id. at 301.
64 Id. at 299.
65 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal.2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186




investor's money is risked in an enterprise in which he has no
managerial control, and the "economic realities test," 6 which finds a
security wherever an investor lacks "practical and actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise, '6 7 have been applied by
some state courts in determinations under their security laws," no
similar construction was made at the federal level until SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises.69
Turner Enterprises breathed life into the dicta advocating flexibility
in Howey70 and Tcherepnin v. Knight.71 In Turner Enterprises, three
types of contracts for self-improvement courses sold by Dare To Be
Great 72 for $1000, $2000, and $5000 were held to be securities under
the federal securities laws,73 even though purchasers were required to
exert personal effort in recruiting and introducing prospective
investors. Adopting a test which it characterized as "more realistic"
7 4
than that of Howey, the court held that the investor was a buyer of a
share of the proceeds of Dare To Be Great's selling efforts, and that
these efforts of its promoters, not the work exerted by the investor,
were "the undeniably significant ones" 75 affecting the success or failure
of the enterprise.
This decision essentially changed the word "solely" in the Howey
definition7 6 to "substantially." That is, when the overall relationship
between the investor and the company is considered, the contribution
of some effort by the investor in a pyramid scheme does not alter his
position as one of fundamental reliance or dependence upon the
management decisions of the company. In articulating a distinction
between managerial, nonmanagerial, and essential managerial efforts,
66 Commissioner of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105
(1971).
67 Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 111 (1971).
6 For affirmative determinations under state blue sky laws, see, e.g., Fortson v. Turner, 3
Blue Sky L. Rep. 71,048 (Bibb County Ga. Super. Ct. 1972); State ex rel. Park and
McEldowney v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct.
1972); DMC of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. 70,897 (Denver County Colo.
Dist. Ct. 1971). Contra, Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970).
66 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
70 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
71 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967):
[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word "security" in the Act,
form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality.
72 See note 2 supra.
11 Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1973); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1973).
74 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).75 
ld.
76 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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the Turner Enterprises case made the Howey test of a security ap-
plicable to situations in which the investor is active as well as
inactive.77 Although this liberalized interpretation provides prosecu-
tors with a cause of action they heretofore did not have, the security
approach is not a panacea since complaints alleging that pyramid
sales schemes are technically securities are incapable of being
processed with the celerity needed to protect potential investors.7 s
Like the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission has achieved limited success in regulating pyramid
schemes through the exercise of general powers. The FTC approach
utilizes an adjudicatory, rather than a rulemaking, process which is
simply not set up to resolve disputes expeditiously. 79 The omission
in the FTC Acts" of a procedure whereby victims of deceptive trade
practices may obtain restitution has also seriously impaired the Act's
effectiveness.8" However, National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC,"-
a 1973 case, appears to have conferred upon the FTC the substantive
regulatory powers common to other administrative agencies by con-
struing its governing statute8 3 as authorizing the FTC "to promulgate
rules defining the meaning of the statutory standards of the illegality
the commission is empowered to prevent.""4 These rules may then be
used by the agency in adjudicatory proceedings in which cease-and-
desist orders are issued against violators of the statutory standard.
There are at least two other possible federal causes of action. Since
the parent company usually tightly controls all phases of the marketing
process, pyramid operations might be accused of vertical restraint of
trade in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 5 For
example, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co.,86 the Supreme
Court distinguished situations in which the manufacturer's retention of
title to the merchandise and the risk of loss makes the dealer indistin-
77 Comment, What is a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises and Franchise Agreements,
22 U. KAN. L. REv. 55, 112 (1973).
78 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 4.
79 Id.
8 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1973).
s' The limitations of the FTC approach to consumer fraud were candidly expressed by
Sen. Frank Moss in his recent criticism: "I sometimes feel the Federal Trade Commission's
procedures and practices are almost a license to steal with impunity." Hearings, supra note
4, at 62.
82 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
81 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1973). The controlling provision was 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1973)
which provides:
[The Commission shall have power] ... [f]rom time to time to classify corpora-
tions and to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title.
84 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
85 15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1973).
8f 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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guishable from its agent from those situations in which the distributor
owns the merchandise. In the former case, price setting and the
allocation of territories is not illegal unless the impact is unreasonably
restrictive of competition. In the latter case, however, no limitations
may be imposed upon the retailer's freedom to determine where and
to whom to resell the goods. Most pyramid operations seem to fall
into the latter category. Also, since the merchandising program is
based on a promised return of investment virtually unattainable in
practice, pyramid operations may violate § 5 of the FTC Act,87 which
declares unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce to be unlawful.
B. State Legislation
Three states allow pyramids to operate subject to regulationa ss Of
these, South Dakota's comprehensive approach, providing for registra-
tion, distribution of prospectuses, voidability of contracts within thirty
days, refund of consideration and return of merchandise, and the
recovery of treble damages by deceived investors, appears best adapted
to insuring informed and voluntary participation.8" Nevertheless, to
regulate is to permit, and even regulations which compel procedural
modifications may leave the substance of chain schemes intact. The
experience of states adopting the regulatory approach has demon-
strated that promoters will intentionally circumvent the restrictions
by not fully complying with the registration and disclosure require-
ments."0 Even in South Dakota, compliance with the registration law
has been unsatisfactory."
All other state legislation in this area has been prohibitory. Several
states have proscribed all endless chain schemes per se.92 A slightly less
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1973).
88 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 166 (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 69 (Supp.
1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 37-25 (Supp. 1972).
89 See Comment, Multi-level or Pyramid Sales Systems: Fraud or Free Enterprise, 18
S.D.L. REV. 358 (1973).
90 Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to be Regulated, 61 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1263 (1973).
91 OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATE CONSUMER
ACTION SUMMARY 1971, at 84 (1972).
92 For example, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-3.3 (Supp. 1974) defines an endless chain
scheme as
any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property whereby a participant
pays a valuable consideration for the chance to receive compensation for
introducing one or more additional persons into participation in the scheme, or
for the chance to receive compensation when a person introduced by the
participant introduces a new participant.
See also CAL. PENALCODE § 327 (West 1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.102.020 (Supp.
1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-15-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-17.1 et seq.
(Supp. 1973).
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direct approach has been to define multilevel schemes as lotteries by
statute.13 This makes it possible to prosecute them under state anti-
lottery laws94 without the intricate definitional and evidentiary prob-
lems which actually proving the existence of a lottery would entail.95
This approach, however, does not adequately protect potential
investors since no provisions provide for recovery by defrauded
investors and the promoters are only minimally regulated. 6
Courts in some states having antilottery statutes without the specific
inclusion of chain schemes have also refused to enforce contracts for
the purchase of merchandise from referral sales operations, but usually
only if the rates charged are clearly excessive. In Sherwood & Roberts
-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach,97 a price of $1,187.28 was attached to a
radio intercom and fire alarm system worth $225.32 and purchased
on a conditional sale contract made pursuant to a promise of $100
commission per successful referral and on the assurance of the sales-
man that the commissions would at least reimburse the buyer for the
purchase price. The court held this scheme to be a lottery since it
was permeated with chance: the chance that the referrals would not
be interested, that the salesman might make an inadequate presentation
or not honor his promise to contact the referrals, that the referrals
had already been referred by someone else, and that market saturation
had occurred." The original agreement and subsequent agreements
made in connection with it were held to be unenforceable. The lottery
approach has been criticized for its reliance on ad hoc determinations
of the legal status of particular schemes, the inhibitory effect it has on
judicial activism because of its penal nature, the lack of satisfactory
93 For example, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.091 (Supp. 1974) classifies as a lottery any
group organized or brought together under any plan or device whereby fees or
dues or anything of material value to be paid or given by members thereof are to
be paid or given to any other member thereof, which plan or device includes
any provision for the increase in such membership through a chain process of
new members securing other new members and thereby advancing themselves
in the group to a position where such members in turn receive fees, dues or
things of material value from other members.
See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.350 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2305
(Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-291.2 (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1066(1961);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2017 (Supp. 1974).
94 All fifty states restrict the operation of lotteries. For a compilation of state lottery statute
citations, see 2 GA. L. REV. 132, 133 n.5 (1967).
" See, e.g., M. Lippincott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress, 204 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1967).
Some courts have held that referral sales schemes are not lotteries because they depend upon
the skill of the purchaser and consequently lack the element of chance; see Yoder v. So-Soft
of Ohio, Inc., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 566, 202 N.E.2d 329 (1963); A. A. Murphy, Inc. v. Taylor, 383
P.2d 648 (Okla. 1963); Krehbiel v. State, 378 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1963).
96 Note, supra note 90, at 1264.
97 67 Wash. 2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965).
91 Id. at 635, 409 P.2d at 163.
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compensation provisions, and its intellectual dishonesty in feigning
gambling, rather than deceit, as the vice being attacked. 9
General consumer protection acts or unfair or deceptive trade
practice (consumer fraud) acts provide the primary means of attack on
pyramid sales schemes in at least fifteen states. 100 Many of these
statutes delegate a broad array of investigatory and injunctive powers
to the state attorney general to discover and prosecute instances of
"deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation,''
or similar abuses. In State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., ' °2 an Iowa provision declaring the advertisement of sales featur-
ing rebates contingent upon the procurement by the customer of
additional purchasers or sales 11 3 to be an "unlawful practice rendering
any obligation incurred by the buyer in connection therewith, com-
pletely void and a nullity,"'1 0 4 was upheld against challenges to its
constitutionality. Responding to Koscot's contention that the Act
infringed its constitutionally protected freedom to contract, the court
held that reasonable and appropriate state legislation designed to
protect the public's health, safety, morals, or welfare is constitutionally
permissible and all contracts are subject to it.' ° '
Investors entering into referral sales contracts in the states that have
enacted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code'00 are immunized from
prosecution for failure to honor them by § 2.411 °10 This provision
allows the buyer, at his option, to retain the goods or services purchased
99 Comment, supra note 20, at 149-50. See also Caples Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
100 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-905 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 262A
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE § 713.24(2)(b) (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
623 (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.801 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325.79(2) (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.120 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-2 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. tit. 73, § 201-2(4)(xii) (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-71.2
(Supp. 1974); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-24-6(13) (Revision, 1972); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(18) (Supp. 1974-75); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2451(a) (Supp. 1974);
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Wis. ADM. CODE AGRIC. 122.01 (1970).
101 IOWA CODE § 713.24(2)(a) (Supp. 1974).
102 191 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1971).
10I See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
104 IOWA CODE § 713.24(2)(b) (Supp. 1974).
105 191 N.W.2d at 630 (Iowa 1971).
106 COLO. REV. STAT. § 73-1-101 et seq. (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 28-31-101 et seq.
(Supp. 1974); IND. CODE tit. 24, art. 4.5, § 1-101 et seq. (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-l-101
et seq. (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 1-101 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75); UTAH ANN.
CODE § 70B-1-101 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. § 40-1-101 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
'0' UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.411 [Referral Sales]:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease the seller or lessor
may not give or offer to give a rebate or discount or otherwise pay or offer to
pay value to the buyer or lessee as an inducement for a sale or lease in
consideration of his giving to the seller or lessor the names of prospective
purchasers or lessees, or otherwise aiding the seller or lessor in making a sale or
lease to another person, if the earning of the rebate, discount or other value is
contingent upon the occurrence of an event subsequent to the time the buyer or
SP'RING 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
without any obligation of payment, or simply to rescind. However,
legitimate referral-type commissions are not affected by this provision:
The evil this section is aimed at is the raising of expectations
in a buyer of benefits to accrue to him from events which are to
occur in the future. This provision has no effect on a seller's
agreement to reduce at the time of the sale the price of an item in
exchange for the buyer's giving the seller a list of prospective
purchasers or assisting in other ways if the price reduction is not
contingent on whether the purchasers do in fact buy or on
whether other events occur in the future.108
A number of other states have achieved the same result by enacting
specific legislation prohibiting conditional referral sales.0 9
The "Unconscionable Contract or Clause" section 1 ° of the Uniform
Commercial Code is a possible ground of attack in forty-nine states,"'
the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands. In State ex rel.
Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 1' the Attorney General of New York success-
fully enjoined the operation of a referral sales arrangement whereby the
home purchasers of color television sets, central vacuum cleaning
systems, and electronic quartz broilers at prices ranging from two to
six times the cost of each unit were guaranteed remuneration for sup-
plying the company with twenty names of persons to whom the
products could be presented. The court held the contracts to be un-
enforceable partly because "the unreasonableness and unfairness""'
lessee agrees to buy or lease. If a buyer or lessee is induced by a violation of this
section to enter into a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, the agreement is
unenforceable by the seller or lessor and the buyer or lessee, at his option, may
rescind the agreement or retain the goods delivered and the benefit of any
services performed, without any obligation to pay for them.
'o8 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.411, Comment 2.
109 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Supp. 1973):
No supplier shall offer to a consumer or represent that a consumer will
receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement for entering into a
consumer transaction in return forgiving the supplier the names of prospective
consumers, or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer
transactions, if earning the benefit is contingent upon an event occurring after
the consumer enters into the transaction.
See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5003 (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1803.10 (West
1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 42-140 (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:361 (1965); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4669 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-1401 (1971); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25A-37 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 122.01 (1970).
110 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1972):
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
111 The UCC has not been adopted in Louisiana.
112 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
13 Id. at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
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of the agreements violated § 2-302(1) of the UCC.114 The court
declared it unconscionable not to advise the consumer clearly, ade-
quately, and "in language that the least educated person could
understand"' 15 that (1) he is entering into a contract, (2) he is per-
sonally liable for the total contract price, and (3) he will be required
to pay the stipulated periodic payments plus carrying charges and
other expenses.
Pyramid sales schemes have also been subject to attack based upon
the monopolistic nature of their marketing procedures. Their insistence
upon the independent contractor status of their distributors for cor-
porate veil purposes 1 6 has helped to undermine their defense against
charges of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1 7 especially in light
of the Schwinn decision." 8 In Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc.," 9 the company-imposed restrictions requiring the distributor and
supervisor to buy only from their sponsor, the limitations on retail
outlets to which a distributor could sell, and the constraints imposed
by the company on advertising, product promotion, transfers of dis-
tributorships, and the prohibition of cooperation with other distributors
were held to impose vertical restraints on trade violative of the New
Jersey Antitrust Act.
20
While these statutes and strategies have in most cases resulted in
successful prosecutions, their effectiveness has been impaired by
delays resulting from the remedial variations and jurisdictional ques-
tions implicit in a state-by-state approach. 12 Since a prohibition on
the purchase of merchandise with the expectation of receiving a rebate
based on the salesman's success is distinguishable from the purchase
of a distributorship with personal rights to recruit, the emphasis upon
referral sales makes much of this legislation inapplicable to multilevel
distributorships, a possibly more outrageous type of pyramid abuse
because they leave the investor without even the merchandise he
would receive in a referral sale.
A standard defense raised by alleged pyramid sales promoters has
been the independent-contractor status of the distributors and oppor-
tunity meeting leaders. Although such independence is routinely
I"4 The contracts were also held to violate 5 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972),
which directs the Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State, to petition a State
Supreme Court for appropriate relief from fraudulent or illegal acts, including "unconscion-
able contract provisions." 52 Misc. 2d at 62, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
52 Misc. 2d at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (1966).
116 See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
117 15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1973).
"18 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
"19 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (1972).
120 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-3 (Supp. 1974).
121 See Note, supra note 90, at 1265. See also part IV infra.
SPRING 19751
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 8:546
asserted in the signed agreements, this claim has ordinarily been re-
jected. The courts, looking to the substance rather than the form of
the contracts, have been able to find an agency relationship and at
least some authorization for the deceptive representations made. For
example, Koscot instructed its recruiters to follow meticulously the
directions in the company-issued "Distributor's Training Manual." '122
The corporate veil has been pierced in a similar manner. In State ex
rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,123 the Kansas court held
that Glenn Turner, who was chairman of the board and organizer of
Koscot, could be held personally liable for fraud or misrepresentation
perpetrated by agents of the company since he personally devised the
merchandising philosophy found in the company's operational
manual.'24
Alternative defense pleadings and strategies have generally been
equally unavailing. The use of state quota systems to prevent market
saturation has been dismissed as a defense, since such limitations are
not effective in a narrow geographical area. 25 The contention that the
income projections contained in the literature distributed to potential
investors should be tolerated as mere advertising puffery, common-
place in modem business, has also been rejected.12 6 Defendants have
122 See, e.g., Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216,230-31, 293 A.2d
682, 690.
123 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d 416.
124 Id. at 679-80, 512 P.2d at 425. A similar conclusion was reached in Kugler.
'25 Responding to Koscot's claim that its distributorships in New Jersey were limited to
one for every 7,000 residents, the court declared:
The imposition of a quota was illusory. Not only did the quota fail to obviate
the vice of market saturation, but it had a potential for inducing purchases of
distributorships. As to the first aspect, it is to be remembered that distributor-
ships are not exclusive as to territory. According to [an expert witness] there is
a strong tendency in such a case for the company to attract a substantial
number of distributors in a given territory because each will recruit the people
he knows best or with whom he comes in contact .... The effect is to bring
about an undue concentration of distributors in particular areas and to make the
sales more difficult. The quota does not change the situation materially....
As to the second aspect of the quota, statements that there were a limited
number of distributorships available had the tendency of making them more
desirable and inducing quicker affirmative response in those to whom the
promise of large incomes had been glowingly made. They were unaware of the
pitfalls of market saturation.
Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 234, 293 A.2d 682, 691-92.
126 Id. at 228, 293 A.2d at 688. The court in Kugler relied on the principle enunciated by the
Supreme Court in FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937):
The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are
trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power
to deceive others less experienced. There is no duty resting upon a citizen to
suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are made
to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element of business
has long since decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and
that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and
deception.
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sometimes resorted to the use of tactics of a more aggressive nature.
These include the instigation of countersuits against government
agencies or officials for malicious prosecution,'27 picketing, advertising,
and challenging the competence or integrity of public officials.128
III. NEW APPROACHES TO CONTROL
A. New York Legislation
An example of a recent legislative enactment directed to the
pyramid problem is §. 359-fff of the Blue Sky Law of New York,12a
which became effective on September 1, 1974. It follows by over two
years New York City's prohibition of endless chain schemes130 and
was drafted in response to demands for remedial legislation preventing
a recurrence of abuses such as those alleged to have been committed
by Holiday Magic, Inc."' The Act is patterned after a Wisconsin
regulation"' and a Washington statute.13'
The New York Act defines chain distributor schemes as sales
devices granting, in exchange for an investment, a right to recruit for
profit one or more persons who are also granted such a right upon the
condition of making an investment.1 4 It effectively prohibits them by
making it a crime to "promote, offer or grant participation" 135 in such
an operation, thereby limiting the number of investors to one. It also
eliminates the use of quotas or other "conditions affecting eligibility""' 6
as a defense. In addition, chain distributor schemes are classified as
securities. 137 This invokes the sanctions of the state's General Business
127 For example, Glenn Turner unsuccessfully sued twenty-seven state attorneys general
for conspiracy to violate his civil rights. Statement of Joel Weisberg, Hearings, supra note 4,
at 60.
"I8 See News Release, supra note 21, at 1.
129 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 359-fff (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
130 New York City Dep't of Consumer Affairs Consumer Protection Regulation 22, pro-
hibiting the operation of endless chain schemes, became effective May 25, 1972.
13 News Release, supra note 21, at 1. See also note I supra.
132 Wis. Dep't of Agriculture Gen. Order 122.01 (April 1, 1970). Unfair trade practice:
The promotional use of a chain distributor scheme in connection with the
solicitation of business investments from members of the public is an unfair
trade practice under section 100.20, Wis. Stats.
The regulation was upheld against a challenge which claimed that it was violative of the first
amendment right of free speech, void for vagueness, a burden on interstate commerce,
preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), a deprivation of the constitutional right to work, an
impairment of due process and the right to contract, and a denial of equal protection. Holiday
Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
13' WASH. REV. CODE § 19.102 (1973).
134 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-fff(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
.35 Id. § 359-fff(l).
136 Id. § 359-fff(2).
137 Id. § 359-fff(3).
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Code,13 authorizing the Attorney General to demand sworn state-
ments and other information from persons involved in security sales
which are or in his opinion may be fraudulent or deceptive."3 9 This
latitude is extended to prohibit pyramid schemes by allowing the
Attorney General to seek injunctions 4 ° and prosecute141 them before
any residents have been defrauded, thus shortcutting the traditional
post facto prosecutions which would be the only available recourse if
pyramid schemes were merely prohibited. This provision affords pro-
tection to the prospective investor who, because of the flight or
judgment-proof status of the promoter, would probably not be able to
recoup his loss if he had invested.
B. Proposed Federal Legislation
Because of the variations in state restrictions and remedies, as well
as the essentially national nature of pyramid operations, the National
Association of Attorneys General has urged the enactment of federal
legislation protecting the public from interstate pyramid sales opera-
tions.142 S. 4043, introduced in the 92d Congress by Senator Walter
Mondale, was revised and reintroduced in the 93d Congress as S.
1939, the "Pyramid Sales Act." This bill passed the Senate on August
22, 1974,143 and was referred to the House Judiciary Committee,
which took no action upon it by the end of the 93d Congress. 4
This proposal would amend 18 U.S.C. § 1341 et seq. (Supp. 1974)
by inserting therein § 1344, which would impose a fine of not more
than $25,000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years upon persons
knowingly selling, offering, or attempting to sell a participation in a
pyramid sales scheme through "any means or instrumentality of
transportation or communication in interstate or foreign commerce or
by use of the mails."'14 5 A pyramid sales scheme is defined as any plan
or operation which includes a means of increasing the participation
therein whereby a participant pays a valuable consideration for the
right to receive compensation either for the introduction of others into
participation in the plan or for the introduction of others into the plan
138 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-59 (McKinney 1968).
139 Id. § 352(1).
140 Id. § 352(i).
141 Id. §§ 352(c)(3), (d); Id. § 358.
142 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 1-2. The adoption of such a proposal has also been
supported by the SEC (Senate Report at 12), the FTC (Senate Report at 15), the Department
of Justice (Senate Report at 19), the International Franchise Association (Hearings, supra
note 4, at 40), and the Direct Selling Association (Hearings at 63).
143 S. 1939, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
144 Letter from Sen. Walter F. Mondale to author, Feb. 6, 1975 (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
145 S. 1939, supra note 143, § 3 (1974).
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by the person introduced originally by the participant.'"' By declaring
pyramid operations illegal per se without regard to such classifications
as "security," "lottery," or manner of promotion, the bill is intended to
expedite litigation by eliminating the necessity of demonstrating the
illegality of every individual marketing plan involving pyramid
selling.147 Section 3 of the bill would charge the Department of Justice
with the responsibility for the prosecution of criminal violations.
The bill would also increase the availability of civil remedies. Sec-
tion 5 would declare any contract made in furtherance of a pyramid
sales scheme to be void. It would additionally hold pyramid operators,
recruiters, and sales personnel jointly and severally liable for treble
damages, legal costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee to any person
they knowingly induce to participate. United States district courts
would be granted original jurisdiction without reference to diversity of
citizenship. States would be allowed to retain or expand existing laws
prohibiting pyramid schemes, 14 but any state legislation providing for
a regulatory approach or other laws permitting acts or practices
expressly forbidden by the federal statute would be preempted.
S. 1939 would concentrate enforcement power in the Attorney
General. After serving notice and providing the opportunity for an
adjudicatory hearing pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 554, the Attorney Gen-
eral would be given the authority to assess fines of up to $10,000 per
day for each violation not only of the Act but of orders or regulations
issued thereunder. He would be directed to exercise this power at his
discretion after consideration of "the nature, circumstances, extent,
and gravity of the violation" and "the degree of culpability, any
history of prior offenses, ability to pay," and "effect on ability to do
business"14 of the person involved. Section 4(c) would empower him
to "compromise, modify, or remit, with or without conditions, any
civil penalty" imposed under the section. Judicial review would be
available by filing a notice of appeal in an appropriate United States
court of appeals within thirty days from the date of the order.
Section 6 is also unique. It would authorize the Attorney General
of the United States or the chief law enforcement officer or attorney
general of any state in which a violation has allegedly occurred to seek
an injunction in an appropriate United States district court against any
person engaged in or "about to engage in" an act or practice constitut-
146 Id. § 2(4).
14 Letter from James T. Halverson, Director of The Bureau of Competition of the Federal
Trade Commission, to Sen. Warren Magnuson, Aug. 8, 1974, in Senate Report, supra note 7,
at 14.
141 S. 1939, supra note 143, § 7 (1974). This provision may be considered a weakness of the
bill. See part IV infra.
149 Id. § 4(a).
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ing a pyramid sales scheme. In allowing a state attorney general to
enforce a federal law in federal court, this proposal would extend a
power not granted by any other federal statute.'5 °
IV. CONCLUSION
While the response of state legislatures, attorneys general, and the
courts to recent pyramid sales abuses has been encouraging, certain
problems are inherent in a state-by-state approach. Even in the short
interval between the initiation of a scheme of activities within a state
and the legal response it generates, the public can sustain significant
harm. 5' After a temporary restraining order is obtained, pyramid op-
erators may continue to solicit business by moving to an adjoining
state with weaker or nonexistent standards. In the absence of federal
intervention, unless and until each state enacts adequate legislation to
cope with this "state hopping" problem, fast-talking operators,
occasionally changing their product, its name, or their corporate name,
can continue to play forums off against each other. 5'
Since fraudulent pyramid sales schemes superficially resemble and
often designate themselves as franchises, duplicative or conflicting
legislation may adversely affect legitimate franchising or other mer-
chandising businesses whose success depends upon standard and
uniform nationwide operations. These companies, particularly the
smaller ones, may be unwilling or unable to incur the increased costs
and risks of inadvertent noncompliance with a multitude of varying
state laws.'' Nor is the alternative of terminating franchise appoint-
ments and vertically integrating their activitie realistically available
to smaller companies. Widespread diversity of state consumer protec-
tion legislation, then, has a chilling effect on competition to the extent
that legitimate franchises are discouraged from expanding, since it
deprives consumers of the variety of choice and economic benefits
flowing from competition among sellers as well as potential investors
of an opportunity to become entrepreneurs.15
150 Letter of W. Vincent Rakestraw, Senate Report, supra note 7, at 17.
In his testimony, Warren Spannaus cited an example of a pyramid accumulating
$36,000 before a temporary restraining order was obtained:
[T]he tragedy is that although it may seem that $36,000 ... could change hands
in a week or two, although that may seem like a small amount of money, that is
probably 7 to 10 persons whose lives have been ruined unnecessarily because
of the failure of a Federal law to be in effect.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 27-28.
152 Statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale, id. at 27.
153 See Statement of Philip Zeidman, id. at 49.
154 See Statement of Norman Axelrad, vice president for public affairs of MacDonald's
Corporation, id. at 45.
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Pyramid sales schemes are a national problem for which there is
presently no satisfactory national solution. The federal administrative
agencies examined are too restricted by outdated procedures, limited
personnel, and lack of enforcement powers to deal efficiently or swiftly
with illegal pyramid sales schemes. The pending federal "Pyramid
Sales Act" legislation15 5 is the only extant proposal which provides
both the uniformity of regulation desirable for the smooth, competitive
functioning of legitimate franchising and direct sales operations and
the flexibility of approach essential to state and federal law enforce-
ment officers and aggrieved individuals seeking redress against illegal
multilevel operations and their owners and promoters.
-Donald Daniels
155 Sen. Mondale will reintroduce the "Pyramid Sales Act" in improved form in the 94th
Congress. Letter from Sen. Walter F. Mondale to author, supra note 144.
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